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DIVING TO NEW DEPTHS: HOW GREEN ENERGY
MARKETS CAN PUSH MINING COMPANIES INTO THE
DEEP SEA, AND WHY NATIONS MUST BALANCE
MINERAL EXPLOITATION WITH MARINE CONSERVATION
CATHERINE DANLEY*
INTRODUCTION
The deep sea is a huge, dark expanse of water that houses some
of the Earth’s most unique, often bizarre, creatures that inspired myths
and legends.1 It is an environment equally mysterious and unknown to
human civilization, with vast areas of the deep seas still unstudied.2 In
fact, scientists have explored only 5 percent of the sea floor, even though
it covers 60 percent of the Earth’s surface.3
Nevertheless, despite the scientific knowledge gaps and technical
hurdles of reaching the seabed, countries across the globe “are claiming ob-
scure and difficult-to-reach tracts of the deep-sea floor, far from the surface
and further still from land,” in the hopes of extracting lucrative natural
resources.4 Massive seabed deposits of iron, cobalt, gold, silver, platinum,
nickel, copper, rare earth minerals, oil, natural gas, and other resources
are driving industrial development deeper into the ocean than ever before.5
In fact, some reports estimate deep-sea minerals to be worth $150 tril-
lion, or “nine pounds of gold for every person on earth.”6
* Catherine Danley is a judicial law clerk at the Idaho Supreme Court. She graduated
from the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law in May 2018 with a certificate
in Environmental and Natural Resource Law.
1 Emily Alder, Sea Monsters, in THE ASHGATE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LITERARY AND CINEMATIC
MONSTERS (Jeffrey Andrew Weinstock ed., 2014); Charles R. Taylor, Fishing with a Bull-
dozer: Options for Unilateral Action by the United States Under Domestic and Interna-
tional Law to Halt Destructive Bottom Trawling Practices on the High Seas, 34 ENVIRONS
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 121, 124 (2010).
2 See David Hartley, Guarding the Final Frontier: The Future Regulations of the Inter-
national Seabed Authority, 26 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 335, 335–36 (2012); Lisa A. Levin
et al., Defining “Serious Harm” to the Marine Environment in the Context of Deep-Seabed
Mining, 74 MARINE POL’Y 245, 248 (2016).
3 Rachel Mills, Why are countries laying claim to the deep-sea floor?, BBC (June 21, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-40248866 [https://perma.cc/F5KN-DE25].
4 Id.
5 See Sophie Cocke, Clarion-Clipperton Fracture Zone: The New Mineral Rush, HUFFPOST
(Dec. 18, 2013), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/12/18/clarion-clipperton-fracture
-zone_n_4467426.html [https://perma.cc/FQ2V-4VE3].
6 Deep-sea Mining FAQ, CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, http://www.biologicaldiversity
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The most advanced and promising opportunity for deep-sea mining
was underway off the coast of Papua New Guinea.7 Nautilus Minerals, a
Canadian corporation,8 obtained licenses from Papua New Guinea to mine
massive sulfide deposits in the Bismarck Sea.9 Nautilus planned to launch
the world’s first deep seabed mining operation, called Solwara 1, in 2019,
but announced financial restructuring instead.10
Essentially, Nautilus planned to use three different robotic ma-
chines to conduct its mining operations, each of which are remote con-
trolled, fifty feet in length, and outweigh a blue whale.11 First, an auxiliary
cutter grinds down the sea floor to make it level enough for the other ma-
chines, a challenge in this volcanic area covered in black smoker chimney
stacks.12 Next, the bulk cutter grinds the resulting slurry up into finer
material for the collection machine to suck up before sending it up to a sur-
face vessel.13 Once at the surface, the ore is dewatered and loaded onto
other boats for transport into ports and the wastewater is pumped back
down to the sea floor.14
Sitting at a depth of 1,600 meters (about 5,250 feet, or almost a mile
under water), the Solwara 1 deposit still offers promises of wealth: esti-
mates calculate over one million tonnes in the deposit, with a 7 percent
.org/campaigns/deep-sea_mining/pdfs/Deep-seaMiningFAQ.pdf [https://perma.cc/BA8U
-Q8UU] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
7 Randy W. Tong, It’s Time to Get Off the Bench: The U.S. Needs to Ratify the Law of the
Sea Treaty Before It’s Too Late, 48 U. PAC. L. REV. 317, 318 (2017); Carol J. Clouse, Can
deep-sea mining avoid the environmental mistakes of mining on land?, GUARDIAN (June 28,
2017), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2017/jun/28/deep-sea-mining
-environmental-mistakes [https://perma.cc/7W56-MATY].
8 Annual Report 2015 Corporate Information, NAUTILUS MINERALS, http://www.nautilus
minerals.com/irm/PDF/1748_0/ [https://perma.cc/YHQ6-3Z33] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
9 Clouse, supra note 7; see also Tong, supra note 7, at 318.
10 Tong, supra note 7; Clouse, supra note 7; Press Release Number 2017-21, Nautilus
Minerals, Nautilus Provides Project Update (Oct. 12, 2017), http://www.nautilusminerals.com
/irm/PDF/1930_0/Nautilusprovidesprojectupdate [https://perma.cc/9GTU-VFZN]; Benjamin
Robinson-Drawbridge, Call for PNG seabed mining licenses to be cancelled, RADIO NEW
ZEALAND (Mar. 15, 2019), https://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/384719
/call-for-png-seabed-mining-licences-to-be-cancelled [https://perma.cc/SP3H-NZHH].
11 Clouse, supra note 7; Robert Ferris, Deep sea mining company reveals new gear, CNBC
(Nov. 11, 2015), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/11/worlds-first-deep-sea-mining-company
-reveals-new-gear.html [https://perma.cc/LCY9-L6BK].
12 See Clouse, supra note 7; NAUTILUS MINERALS, SOLWARA 1 PROJECT: ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT 3 (2008), http://www.nautilusminerals.com/irm/content/pdf/environ
ment-reports/Environmental%20Impact%20Statement%20Executive%20Summary%20
(English).pdf [https://perma.cc/ZQ9M-FL48].
13 Ferris, supra note 11.
14 Id.
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copper grade (compared with 0.6 percent at a land-based mine) and gold
grades over twenty grams/ton at some intercepts.15 Papua New Guinea
stands to greatly benefit economically from mining, as well.16 The coun-
try owns about 30 percent interest in the project and there is an expected
$142 million in direct benefits alone over the course of Solwara 1’s twenty-
year license.17 Now, however, the question over the leases remains.18 With
Nautilus currently up for sale, interested investors could gain the licenses
Nautilus holds in Papua New Guinea and Tonga.19
In addition to minerals, the seabed also contains natural gas de-
posits, essentially frozen in place as methane hydrates. Over the last few
years, Japan has invested about $1 billion in research and development
for domestic methane hydrate extraction, an abundant resource off Japan’s
coasts.20 In 2013, a Japanese government-funded research group conducted
the world’s first extraction of natural gas from methane hydrates.21 The
process began by drilling a well, and then implementing “a submersible
pump to suck water out of the sediments.”22 The pressure change from the
decreased water level released the gas, which was then piped to a vessel
on the ocean surface.23 While the 2013 research team faced problems when
sand got into the pipes, extraction methods continued to develop in 2017
with new polymer-coated pipes.24 Vessels piped 235,000 cubic meters of
natural gas earlier this year, and Japan hopes to launch commercial
methane hydrate natural gas production between 2023 and 2027.25 India,
15 Clive Schofield, New Marine Resource Opportunities, Fresh Challenges, 35 U. HAW. L.
REV. 715, 728 (2013); Fact Sheet (2015), NAUTILUS MINERALS, http://www.nautilusmin
erals.com/IRM/Company/ShowPage.aspx?CategoryId=332&CPID=1697&EID=25173525
[https://perma.cc/Z7JZ-25XR] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019); PNG, NAUTILUS MINERALS,
http://www.nautilusminerals.com/irm/content/png.aspx?RID=258 [https://perma.cc/A43P
-CM2G] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
16 See Luz Danielle O. Bolong, Into the Abyss: Rationalizing Deep Seabed Mining Through
Pragmatism and International Law, 25 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 127, 135–36 (2016).
17 Id.
18 Seabed mining project in PNG moves to sell assets, RADIO NEW ZEALAND (Feb. 26, 2019),
https://www.radionz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/383392/seabed-mining-project-in
-png-moves-to-sell-assets [https://perma.cc/U4S4-2GL4].
19 Id.
20 Sarah Lazarus, Can Japan burn flammable ice for energy?, CNN (Nov. 2, 2017), http://
www.cnn.com/2017/10/31/asia/on-japan-flammable-ice/index.html [https://perma.cc/XV6T
-3GL5].
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.; Japan reports successful gas output test from methane hydrate, REUTERS (May 8,
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Canada, China, and the United States are also hoping to exploit their
methane hydrate deposits.26
However, while deep-sea mining holds potential for great wealth
and economic development, it risks environmental harms and diplomatic
disputes on a global scale.27 These concerns grow as energy markets and
economic drivers push mining companies to the deep sea to match miner-
als supplies with growing demands.28 Part I of this Article will examine
the types of minerals in the seabed and the unique environments that
formed those deposits. Part II will discuss the historical development of
deep-sea mining and the development of legal regimes to govern the world’s
oceans and seabed resources. Part III will discuss the renewable energy
market trends and economic incentives that are making deep-sea mining
a commercial reality. Part IV will present the importance of balancing
mineral exploitation with marine conservation under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS III”) and recommend con-
siderations to help combat potential legal, environmental, and political
challenges. This Article concludes that the increasing demands for renew-
able energy will drive the mineral market to new mining venues in the
seabed, which holds greater mineral concentrations and quantities than
terrestrial reserves,29 but that such new mining ventures can be done in
more environmentally responsible ways.
I. HARVESTING THE RESOURCES OF THE DEEP SEA
While the deep sea lacks the krakens feared by ancient sailors, it
holds many other mysterious creatures that inspired both historical fish
2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/japan-methane-hydrate/japan-reports-successful
-gas-output-test-from-methane-hydrate-idUSL4N1IA35A [https://perma.cc/SR4H-W2TA].
26 See REUTERS, supra note 25.
27 See Michael W. Lodge & Philomène A. Verlaan, Deep-Sea Mining: International Regu-
latory Challenges and Responses, 14 ELEMENTS 331, 331–32 (2018); Jon Letman, The
Race Is On to Mine the Deep Sea—But Scientists Are Wary, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 29,
2018), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/2018/08/news-race-to-mine-deep
-sea-drones-seafloor-environmental-impact.html [https://perma.cc/L6MF-RNBM].
28 See Andrew Bloodworth & Gus Gunn, The Future of the Global Minerals and Metals
Sector: Issues and Challenges out to 2050, 15 GEOSCIENCES 90, 93 (2012).
29 Damian Carrington, Is deep sea mining vital for a greener future—even if it destroys
ecosystems?, GUARDIAN (June 4, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017
/jun/04/is-deep-sea-mining-vital-for-greener-future-even-if-it-means-destroying-precious
-ecosystems [https://perma.cc/X2QH-9N26]; Nicola Jones, A Scarcity of Rare Metals Is
Hindering Green Technologies, YALE ENV’T 360 (Nov. 18, 2013), https://e360.yale.edu
/features/a_scarcity_of_rare_metals_is_hindering_green_technologies [https://perma.cc/36LC
-CAPA].
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tales and modern works, like Jules Verne’s Twenty Thousand Leagues
Under the Sea.30 In addition, the oil and gas deposits hold potential for
energy expansions, while deep-sea minerals provide lucrative metals that
are essential to modern technology, including cell phones, computers, solar
panels, and wind turbines.31 For example, rare earth minerals are a group
of seventeen chemical elements with diverse, highly specialized uses, such
as construction of mobile phones, advanced motors, generators, oil-refinery
catalysts, and superstrong magnets.32 Despite the name, rare earths are
widely distributed in the Earth’s crust, but they rarely appear in concen-
trated forms that can be mined at a profit.33 Likewise, tellurium—a rare
metal essential to solar panels—is three times rarer than gold and is 50,000
times more concentrated in seabed deposits than in terrestrial mines.34
Four main types of mineral deposits occur on the sea floor, varying
in location because unique deep-sea environments form each deposit type:
(a) polymetallic nodules that sit across the abyssal sea plain; (b) cobalt
crusts woven into sea mounts; (c) polymetallic sulfide deposits that form
at hydrothermal vent sites; and (d) methane hydrates that tend to form at
the edges of continental shelves (see Figures A and B).35 This Part will dis-
cuss each of these types of deep-sea mineral deposits in turn.
A. Abyssal Sea Plains and Polymetallic Nodules
Throughout the sea, potato-shaped polymetallic nodules litter
the ocean floor.36 These nodules range from the size of potatoes to the
size of cannonballs and are the most abundant material on the seabed
after clay and silica.37 Rich in manganese, cobalt, copper, nickel, and rare
earth elements—all metals essential for modern technology and clean
30 TONY KOSLOW, THE SILENT DEEP: THE DISCOVERY, ECOLOGY, AND CONSERVATION OF THE
DEEP SEA 45 (2007); Sea Monsters, AM. MUSEUM NAT. HISTORY, https://www.amnh.org
/exhibitions/mythic-creatures/water-creatures-of-the-deep/sea-monsters/ [https://perma
.cc/H5DY-KAAN] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
31 Kate Baggaley, These Fearsome Robots Will Bring Mining to the Deep Ocean, NBC
(Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/innovation/these-fearsome-robots-will-bring
-mining-deep-ocean-n724901 [https://perma.cc/9ZSJ-RMY2]; Carrington, supra note 29.
32 Amory Lovins, Clean energy and rare earths: Why not to worry, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS
(May 23, 2017), https://thebulletin.org/2017/05/clean-energy-and-rare-earths-why-not-to
-worry/10785 [https://perma.cc/N6D9-WFX6].
33 Id.
34 Carrington, supra note 29; Jones, supra note 29.
35 Bolong, supra note 16, at 133; see Gas Hydrates, NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LABORATORY, https://
www.netl.doe.gov/oil-gas/gas-hydrates [https://perma.cc/FT62-8NRA] (last visited Oct. 28,
2019).
36 Cocke, supra note 5.
37 KOSLOW, supra note 30, at 162.
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energy—these nodules offer wealth to nations willing to harvest them, es-
pecially as consumer demand for high-tech gadgets increases across the
world.38 The nodules form as layers of iron and manganese hydroxides
concretions around a central core, but the exact cause of their formation
remains speculative.39 Even so, the growth of the nodules is very slow,
even for geological processes, with every centimeter of the nodule taking
several million years to form.40
Figure A: Global Distribution of Deep-Sea Minerals41
38 Schofield, supra note 15, at 728–29; Cocke, supra note 5.
39 Polymetallic Nodules, INT’L SEABED AUTH., https://ran-s3.s3.amazonaws.com/isa.org.jm/s3fs
-public/documents/EN/Brochures/ENG7.pdf [https://perma.cc/CG9N-MS4X] (last visited
Oct. 28, 2019).
40 Id.
41 Wealth in the Oceans: Deep sea mining on the horizon?, UNITED NATIONS ENV’T
PROGRAMME (May 2014), https://na.unep.net/geas/archive/pdfs/GEAS_May2014_Deep
SeaMining.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5FG-WFSC].
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Figure B: Global Distribution of Methane Hydrates42
While polymetallic nodules litter huge sections of the globe, both
in lakes and oceans, the highest concentrations occur between 4,000 and
6,000 meters under the sea.43 To be economically viable, polymetallic nod-
ules require concentrations of about ten kilograms of nodules per square
meter of seabed, and each nodule should contain at least 27 percent man-
ganese, about 1 percent each of copper and nickel, and 0.2 percent cobalt.44
Therefore, only three areas in the ocean have economically viable concen-
trations of polymetallic nodules: between Hawaii and Central America;
in the Pacific Ocean’s Peru Basin; and in the northern Indian Ocean.45 The
Clarion-Clipperton Fracture Zone (“CCZ”)—a seabed area the size of the
United States stretching across the Equatorial North Pacific—is now home
to seventeen mining claims from various nations, including Germany,
Russia, Japan, France, China, the United Kingdom, Tonga, the Cook
Islands, and others (see Figure C).46 The CCZ holds over “27 billion
tonnes of nodules containing . . . 7 billion tonnes of manganese, 340
42 Where are gas hydrates found?, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, https://www.usgs.gov/faqs
/where-are-gas-hydrates-found?qt-news_science_products=0#qt-news_science_products
[https://perma.cc/E8JY-FJCT] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
43 Hartley, supra note 2, at 348.
44 Id.
45 Id.; INT’L SEABED AUTH., supra note 39.
46 Cocke, supra note 5; Deep Seabed Minerals Contractors, INT’L SEABED AUTH., https://www
.isa.org.jm/deep-seabed-minerals-contractors [https://perma.cc/4L4N-69YN] (last visited
Oct. 28, 2019) (As of March 2019, there are seventeen contracts for nodule exploration,
seven contracts for polymetallic sulfides, and five for cobalt crusts, totaling twenty-nine
exploration contracts through the ISA.).
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million tonnes of nickel, 290 million tonnes of copper and 78 million tonnes
of cobalt,” as well as rare earth elements, making the CCZ the largest
known concentration of polymetallic nodules in the world.47
Figure C: The Clarion-Clipperton Zone48
© International Seabed Authority 2019
The nodules usually sit half-buried in the surrounding sediment of the
abyssal plains,49 an environment unique for its dark and slow ecology.
The sea floor here is a nutrient-poor ecosystem, at least organically poor,
as well as an unproductive one.50 The unproductivity of the abyss is best
displayed in a story about submarine sandwiches. When the submersible
Alvin sank in 1968, the crew escaped but without any time to grab their
lunch: bologna sandwiches, apples, and a broth-filled thermos packed in
47 L.M. Wedding et al., Managing Mining of the Deep Seabed, 349 SCI. MAG. 144, 144 (2015);
see Schofield, supra note 15, at 729.
48 The map displays contracts as of December 2016. Exploration Areas, INT’L SEABED
AUTH., https://www.isa.org.jm/contractors/exploration-areas [https://perma.cc/7WFU-8RS2]
(last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
49 Hartley, supra note 2, at 348.
50 KOSLOW, supra note 30, at 79.
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a lunch box.51 After recovering both the submersible and lunch box ten
months later, surprised researchers found the food unspoiled and, theo-
retically, edible.52 Scientific experiments later concluded that slow micro-
bial activity preserved the food, not the cold water temperatures.53
Slow seems to be the abyss’s primary speed, applying to sediment
as well as species. For instance, larger species on the sea floor, such as fish
and octopuses, tend to have long lifespans, reproduce slowly, and take
years to reach sexual maturity.54 Meanwhile, the accumulation rate of
sediment in deep-sea clay amounts to only one millimeter every thousand
years, with much of the seabed clay having both terrestrial and cosmic
origins from periods when meteors rained down onto the earth.55 Never-
theless, and somewhat paradoxically, the unproductive abyssal deep sea
contains highly diverse species, rivaling and outpacing the biodiversity of
tropical rainforests despite their dynamic growth.56 Species in the abyssal
plains include sponges, clams, mussels, corals, and xenophyphores (gigan-
tic unicellular sponge-like organisms), with most species living in the top
five to ten centimeters of sediment.57 Moreover, about eighty to 100 dif-
ferent invertebrate species occupy a single square meter of sediment.58
The mining techniques required to harvest the nodules have been
compared to “standing on top of a skyscraper on a windy day and trying to
suck marbles off the street with a vacuum cleaner hose.”59 Here, hyper-
bole meets reality. The best methods proposed so far are hydraulic mining
51 Id. at 80.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 See id. at 83–84; Craig R. Smith et al., Areas of Particular Environmental Interest (or
“Protected Areas”) for Ecosystem Based Management of the Clarion-Clipperton Zone:
Rationale and Recommendations to the International Seabed Authority, UNIV. OF HAW.,
https://ran-s3.s3.amazonaws.com/isa.org.jm/s3fs-public/documents/EN/Workshops/2010
/Pres/SMITH.pdf [https://perma.cc/JY3P-8E2H] (last visited on Oct. 28, 2019).
55 KOSLOW, supra note 30, at 33.
56 Ken Stier, Laying Waste to the Deep Sea, TIME (Dec. 13, 2007), http://content.time.com
/time/health/article/0,8599,1694495,00.html [https://perma.cc/N3W5-MKCF]; see KOSLOW,
supra note 30, at 79.
57 Levin et al., supra note 2, at 250–51; CTR. FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, supra note 6;
David Shukman, Renewables’ deep-sea mining conundrum, BBC (Apr. 11, 2017), http://
www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-39347620 [https://perma.cc/N53Z-TC5R].
58 See Smith et al., supra note 54.
59 Jason C. Nelson, The Contemporary Seabed Mining Regime: A Critical Analysis of the
Mining Regulations Promulgated by the International Seabed Authority, 16 COLO. J. INT’L
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 27, 40 (2005) (citing DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND LAWS OF THE
SEA, UNITED NATIONS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (A
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE) (1998)).
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systems that essentially suck up ore crushed by a robotic device on the
sea floor, pulling it thousands of meters through the water column to a
floating mining platform on the surface.60 Once there, workers dewater
the ore, ship the dewatered ore to port, and pump the remaining water
back down to the seabed.61
Environmental concerns over polymetallic mining include vehicles
crushing organisms within the seabed, the resulting sediment plumes,
wastewater discharge, and noise pollution.62 More specifically, the robotic
vehicles crushing ore could also crush 95 to 100 percent of organisms living
along the vehicle’s direct path while the sediment plumes and wastewater
will impact aquatic life from the sea surface down through the water col-
umn as wastes are discharged from the surface vessel.63 Sediment and
wastewater at the surface can deplete light and oxygen, which affects
photosynthesis and water temperatures.64 In addition, noise pollution will
adversely impact sound-sensitive organisms, like marine mammals, in the
water column and may have unknown impacts at the seabed.65 Noise pol-
lution can travel 1,500 miles or more underwater,66 and it interferes with
species’ communication, navigation, hunting, and predator detection.67
While vast and diverse, the abyssal plain’s ecological consistency,
slowness, and stability make it especially vulnerable to deep-sea mining
impacts.68 This expanse of the deep sea “has evolved within the most stable
and least productive environment on earth”; it is a place of fragile fauna,
age-old organisms, low reproduction rates, and limited dispersal rates.69
In short, this is not an ecosystem built to handle catastrophic distur-
bances.70 For instance, in the 1970s and 1980s, projects similar to deep-sea
mining had monumental impacts on the abyssal environment, including
60 Hartley, supra note 2, at 348–49.
61 Hartley, supra note 2, at 348–49; Ferris, supra note 11.
62 Hartley, supra note 2, at 357–58.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 358; Levin et al., supra note 2, at 250.
65 Christopher Clark & Brandon Southall, Turn down the volume in the ocean, CNN
(Jan. 20, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/19/opinion/clark-southall-marine/index.html
[https://perma.cc/X3QV-PNDT].
66 Hartley, supra note 2, at 359.
67 Clark & Southall, supra note 65.
68 Kathryn A. Miller et al., An Overview of Seabed Mining Including the Current State
of Development, Environmental Impacts, and Knowledge Gaps,4 FRONTIERS IN MARINE
SCI. 2, 15 (2018), https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fmars.2017.00418/full [https://
perma.cc/UE2Y-FD95].
69 KOSLOW, supra note 30, at 169; Wedding et al., supra note 47, at 144.
70 See KOSLOW, supra note 30, at 169; Wedding et al., supra note 47, at 144.
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the destruction of 50 to 90 percent of macrofaunal groups after scientists
ploughed eleven square kilometers off the coast of Peru.71 However, re-
searchers also noted that, despite evident plough marks seven years later,
the fauna had returned almost completely in the otherwise undisturbed
sediment.72 Whether or not deep-sea mining will catastrophically destroy
abyssal plain sea life remains a question for researchers, but some believe
that some effects from mining operations could last for millennia.73
B. Seamounts and Cobalt Crusts
In addition to the abundance of polymetallic nodules, the deep sea
also contains cobalt crusts woven into the summits of seamounts.74 Al-
though named for their high cobalt concentrations (up to 1.7 percent), these
crusts also contain titanium, cerium, nickel, platinum, manganese, phos-
phorus, thallium, tellurium, zirconium, tungsten, bismuth, and molybde-
num, making them a lucrative source of metals and rare earth elements.75
The crusts form over millennia as mineral precipitation in the surrounding
seawater forms a thin, accumulating layer where currents sweep areas
clear of sediments.76 Like polymetallic nodules, cobalt crusts grow slowly,
accumulating an additional one to six millimeters per million years.77
Most of the Earth’s cobalt crusts are in the Pacific Ocean, forming
pavements up to twenty-five centimeters thick across many square kilo-
meters of seamount summits and flanks, ridges, and plateaus.78 The
“thickest crusts, richest in cobalt, occur on outer-rim terraces and on broad
saddles on the summits of seamounts, at depths of 800–2,500 meters,”79
which places some of the best potential mining sites within Pacific coastal
areas, including Johnston Island, Hawaii, the Marshall Islands, the Fed-
erated States of Micronesia, and international waters of the mid-Pacific.80
Seamounts can be enormous, with many as large as the famous
mountain ranges on the continents.81 With large mountains comes large
71 KOSLOW, supra note 30, at 169.
72 Id.
73 Levin et al., supra note 2, at 250.
74 KOSLOW, supra note 30, at 170.
75 Cobalt-Rich Crusts, INT’L SEABED AUTH., https://www.isa.org.jm/files/documents/EN
/Brochures/ENG9.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZ3H-J5AR] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
76 Id.; see Levin et al., supra note 2, at 246, 253.
77 INT’L SEABED AUTH., supra note 75.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
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biodiversity; the seamounts often have large, sessile animals, like sponges
and corals, giant protozoans called xenophyophores, and mobile fish and
crabs.82 The height and steepness of seamounts can also contribute to bio-
mass and biological productivity, because the tallest rocky formations alter
ocean currents and direct nutrients towards the sea surface.83 Above these
peaks, nutrient-rich waters result in higher concentrations of fish, marine
mammals, prey organisms, and organic detritus.84 Likewise, the seamount’s
depths can create diversity among the benthic and pelagic species.85
Nevertheless, little is known about these mountainous environ-
ments “beyond the fact that they are complex and variable; two seamounts
at the same depth can have completely different biological components.”86
The ecology and formations of seamounts are “determined by a variety
of factors, including current patterns, topography, seamount size, water
depth, seawater oxygen content, bottom-sediment and rock types and
coverage.”87 Scientists estimate that between 30,000 and 100,000 sea-
mounts rise above the sea floor, including the longest mountain chain in
the world—the Mid-Ocean Ridge—that circles the globe like the stitches
on a baseball.88 Nevertheless, researchers have explored less than 1 per-
cent of these deep-sea mountains.89 In fact, “[o]nly a few of the estimated
30,000 seamounts that occur in the Pacific, where the richest deposits are
found, have been mapped and sampled in detail.”90
Despite shallower waters for mineral extraction, cobalt crusts can
be more difficult to mine than nodules because the crust must be removed
from underlying rock.91 Therefore, while environmental impacts on sea-
mounts could be more localized, mining here still raises concerns over po-
tential damage to local fauna and wildlife.92 In order to remove the crusts,
large robotic machines dig in and crush the ore, then send the slurry up to
surface mining vessels through riser and lifting systems.93 However, be-
cause the crusts are embedded in rock, it is difficult to collect the crusts
82 Levin et al., supra note 2, at 253.
83 Taylor, supra note 1, at 128; INT’L SEABED AUTH., supra note 75.
84 Taylor, supra note 1, at 128–29.
85 Id.
86 INT’L SEABED AUTH., supra note 75.
87 Id.
88 Taylor, supra note 1, at 125, 128.
89 Id. at 125.
90 INT’L SEABED AUTH., supra note 75.
91 KOSLOW, supra note 30, at 170.
92 Id.
93 Levin et al., supra note 2, at 253.
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without diluting the ore in too much substrate.94 Moreover, the rugged ter-
rain and steep summits make machinery operations difficult.95 Inevitably,
mining the crusts will cause plumes of sediment, which can bury, smother,
and blind organisms, as well as disrupt the food chain and prevent species
colonization.96 Damage to the seamount ridges and summits also poses
concerns regarding potentially altered current flows and biological nu-
trient distribution.97
C. Hydrothermal Vents and Polymetallic Sulfide Deposits
Like estuaries, hydrothermal vents are unique, but unstable, eco-
systems that exist between two distinct environments.98 Hydrothermal
vents are often called “black smokers” because they shoot out 660°F water
full of iron and metal sulfides, which turns into a black plume when it hits
the frigid seawater surrounding the vents.99 Scientists conducting under-
water exploration first discovered these chimney-like structures in 1979,
along with new hosts of hydrothermal vent species found nowhere else on
earth.100 As recently as the 2000 to 2010 Census of Marine Life, research-
ers discovered the yeti crab near vents by Easter Island, “which is not
only a hairy new species, but also a new genus and a new family.”101 The
species in these deep-sea ecosystems cannot rely on light, or even organic
detritus, for survival like shallower ocean life does.102 Indeed, while most
life on earth depends on photosynthesis—the sunlight-based process of
converting inorganic carbon into organic compounds103—hydrothermal
94 INT’L SEABED AUTH., supra note 75.
95 Levin et al., supra note 2, at 253.
96 Id.
97 Taylor, supra note 1, at 128; INT’L SEABED AUTH., supra note 75.
98 KOSLOW, supra note 30, at 101.
99 Id. at 100.
100 Hartley, supra note 2, at 349; Polymetallic Sulfides, INT’L SEABED AUTH., https://ran-s3
.s3.amazonaws.com/isa.org.jm/s3fs-public/documents/EN/Brochures/ENG8.pdf [https://
perma.cc/N6JR-XVVW] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
101 CENSUS OF MARINE LIFE, FIRST CENSUS OF MARINE LIFE 2010: HIGHLIGHTS OF A
DECADE OF DISCOVERY 13 (2010), http://www.coml.org/comlfiles/partner2010/Final%20
Report%209-14%20small.pdf [https://perma.cc/VBK3-XUXF].
102 What conditions exist for life in the deep ocean?, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC
ADMIN., http://oceanexplorer.noaa.gov/facts/deep-habitat.html [https://perma.cc/4EWT
-8PDB] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
103 Carbon Cycle Glossary, SCI. EDUC. RESEARCH CTR. AT CARLETON COLLEGE, https://serc
.carleton.edu/eslabs/carbon/carbon_cycle_gl.html [https://perma.cc/P33D-SQTR] (last modi-
fied Nov. 8, 2016).
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vent ecosystems depend on chemosynthesis, where microbes live off chem-
ical compounds, like hydrogen sulfide and methane.104
In contrast to the abyssal plains, what hydrothermal vents lack
in biodiversity they make up for in productivity.105 Around the hydrother-
mal vents are unique ecosystems, abundant in “extremophile” microbes
and larger species such as giant clams, crabs, shrimp, barnacles, corals,
sponges, octopuses, and numerous vent worms.106 The microbes of these
ecosystems are called extremophiles because they live in some of the
harshest environments in the world; the extremophiles adapted to sur-
vive without light, endure high pressure and scorching temperatures,
withstand lethal chemicals, and live in highly saline or acidic waters.107
Even larger species must endure extreme conditions. For instance, the
Pompeii worms living on the black smoker chimneys “are routinely bathed
by vent waters at 30–70°C and may experience a 60°C range in tempera-
ture from one end of their body to the other.”108
In addition to unique organisms, this volcanic environment also
developed sulfide deposits (often called sea floor massive sulfides).109 As
magma chambers rise close to the sea floor, the hydrothermal convection
system above “leaches various metals out of the deep volcanic rock—
mostly iron, manganese, copper, and zinc, but also silver and gold—and
precipitates them out” into seafloor chimneys and deposits.110 In fact, one
black smoker deposits approximately 250 tonnes of ore per day, while the
sulfide deposits range in size from 1 to 10 million tonnes of ore.111 Hydro-
thermal activity is most intense in subduction zones, where tectonic plates
collide, forcing one to subduct beneath the other.112
Nautilus Minerals would have been the “first company to commer-
cially explore the seafloor for massive sulphide systems, a potential source
of high grade copper, gold, zinc and silver.”113 Its mining method consists
of sea floor robots chopping the sulfide deposit into slurry before pump-
ing the ore slurry to a surface mining vessel.114 Once there, the workers
104 Hartley, supra note 2, at 360.
105 KOSLOW, supra note 30, at 101.
106 Schofield, supra note 15, at 730; Carrington, supra note 29.
107 Schofield, supra note 15, at 730; INT’L SEABED AUTH., supra note 100.
108 KOSLOW, supra note 30, at 100–01.
109 Id. at 171.
110 Id. at 170–71.
111 Id. at 171.
112 Id. at 170.
113 Overview, NAUTILUS MINERALS, http://www.nautilusminerals.com/irm/content/overview
.aspx?RID=252&RedirectCount=1 [https://perma.cc/DA65-8TZ8] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
114 NAUTILUS MINERALS, supra note 12, at 5–6.
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dewater the ore at the surface vessel, discharge the water and fine parti-
cles back into the ocean near the seabed, and then load the dewatered ore
onto shuttle barges for transfers back to port.115 Thus, polymetallic sulfide
mining employs a process similar to nodule mining, but in a radically dif-
ferent environment. These mining schemes are comparable to open-pit
mining on land, but they have the additional complication of getting the
ore through the water column to the surface, which is located hundreds,
if not thousands, of meters above the deposit.116
Hydrothermal sulfide mining shares many of the environmental
concerns that extracting polymetallic nodules does, “including the destruc-
tion of surfaces where animals live, their burial under disturbed sediment
and chemical changes due to the suspension of a particulate plume in the
bottom water.”117 However, hydrothermal vents carry additional concerns
of harming endemic species and vent connectivity. There are approxi-
mately 400 known active vent sites around the world,118 each highly local-
ized, and often occurring between 1,200 and 3,000 meters in depth across
mid-ocean ridges, basins, and volcanoes.119 Hydrothermal vents are like
islands—each attracts life and develops in isolation, making each chimney
home to unique species.120 As a result, destroying one vent site may cause
the extinction of a rare species.121 Equally concerning is the knowledge
that vent sites are connected, but scientists still need to find out how much
connectivity exists and whether mining can impact connected sites.122
Despite apprehensions, some scientists estimate rapid recoveries
at hydrothermal vent sites after mining cessation because some naturally
disturbed sites recovered “within five to 10 years, after being completely
obliterated by a single volcanic event.”123 Likewise, some researchers
believe that these ecosystems developed resilience in response to volcanic
disturbances.124 Inactive vent sites are also less likely to suffer serious
losses of biodiversity because the vent’s iconic and endemic species tend
to die off quickly after hydrothermal activity stops.125 However, the rarity
115 Id.
116 See Levin et al., supra note 2, at 251.
117 INT’L SEABED AUTH., supra note 100.
118 Levin et al., supra note 2, at 251.
119 Id.
120 Hartley, supra note 2, at 360.
121 Id. at 361.
122 Id.
123 Carrington, supra note 29.
124 INT’L SEABED AUTH., supra note 100.
125 KOSLOW, supra note 30, at 172; Levin et al., supra note 2, at 252.
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and endemic nature of many vent species still carries the risk of extinction
if mining operations destroy the base population.126
D. Methane Hydrates and the Continental Shelf
The most recent discovery of deep-sea resources is the massive re-
serves of methane hydrate in continental slope sediments.127 Methane hy-
drate is a naturally occurring clathrate—“a chemical compound in which
molecules of one material (the ‘host’) form a solid lattice that encloses mol-
ecules of another material (the ‘guest’).”128 Essentially, if buoyant natural
gas seeps from the ocean floor into a “zone of hydrate stability”—an area
of sufficiently cold temperatures and high pressure—the gas combines
with the water such that the methane molecules become trapped in cubic
ice lattices.129 Although these frozen natural gas deposits vary in size, they
are all “extremely large.”130 For example, “North and South Carolina alone
contain more than 37 trillion cubic meters of methane gas, more than 70
times the US gas consumption in 1989,”131 and seabed hydrates overall
“have been estimated to contain twice the carbon in all known coal, oil and
natural gas reserves.”132 Likewise, the deposits are highly concentrated,
where “one cubic foot of solid methane hydrate will release about 164 cubic
feet of methane gas.”133
However, methane hydrate is also “tied to its environment—it re-
quires very specific conditions to form and remain stable.”134 In the marine
environment, methane hydrates are typically found in the Arctic Ocean
and along outer continental shelves because these are “natural settings
where methane and water are present, and where pressure and tempera-
ture conditions are suitable to form and sustain hydrate.”135
Despite being the most difficult and expensive source of natural
gas to recover,136 methane hydrates still hold vast potential as an energy
126 INT’L SEABED AUTH., supra note 100.
127 KOSLOW, supra note 30, at 173.
128 NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., ENERGY RESOURCE POTENTIAL OF METHANE HYDRATE: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE AND ENERGY POTENTIAL OF A UNIQUE RESOURCE 8 (2011).
129 KOSLOW, supra note 30, at 173–74; NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., supra note 128, at 10.
130 KOSLOW, supra note 30, at 173–74.
131 Id. at 173.
132 Schofield, supra note 15, at 724.
133 NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., supra note 128, at 9.
134 Id. at 8.
135 Id. at 9.
136 Schofield, supra note 15, at 725.
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source.137 Because natural gas “currently accounts for nearly a quarter of
the U.S. energy supply,” a share predicted to remain constant, domestic
production must increase by 10 percent over the next twenty-five years “to
keep pace with rising consumption.”138 Given these continually increasing
natural gas demands, methane hydrate sources could provide abundant
natural gas resources for energy independence and cheaper energy sup-
plies, especially in nations like Japan, a country that imports over 90 per-
cent of its energy supply.139
However, “[t]he potential environmental risks from methane hy-
drate extraction are as poorly understood as the methods that will be
required to extract the gas commercially from its matrix of sediment and
ice.”140 Concerns include methane losses to the atmosphere; exacerbating
global warming; immediate, deadly destruction of industry vessels from
explosions; and potential sea floor instability and underwater landslides
after removal.141
II. SEABED EXPLORATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF UNCLOS III
A. Historical Explorations of the Seabed
Oceans cover three-quarters of the Earth, contain 97 percent of the
planet’s water, and “represent 99 percent of the living space on the planet
by volume.”142 Nevertheless, throughout most of human history, civiliza-
tions viewed the seabed as a barren desert143 and the sea as the danger-
ous home of lurking monsters.144 In fact, as Socrates prepared for his death
in ancient Greece, he argued that heaven would be as superior to earth as
land is to the sea, because “in the sea all things are corroded by the brine,
neither is there any noble or perfect growth, but caverns only, and sand,
and an endless slough of mud.”145 This view of the sea persisted until the
early nineteenth century, when scientists and explorers wondered if
137 Id. at 725–26; see NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., supra note 128, at 4.
138 NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., supra note 128, at 4.
139 Lazarus, supra note 20; REUTERS, supra note 25.
140 KOSLOW, supra note 30, at 174.
141 Id.
142 Goal 14: Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources, UNITED
NATIONS, http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/oceans/ [https://perma.cc/U87X-RLKF]
(last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
143 KOSLOW, supra note 30, at 10.
144 Alder, supra note 1.
145 PLATO, DIALOGUES OF PLATO 242–43 (Cynthia Brantley Johnson ed., Benjamin Jowett
trans., Simon & Schuster Paperbacks 2013).
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more lay at the bottom of the deep sea than their ancient predecessors
had ever realized.146
Explorations of the deep sea began early in the nineteenth cen-
tury, including naturalist Edward Forbes’s 1841 expedition on the H.M.S.
Beacon around the Aegean Sea.147 Other expeditions—including Captain
John Ross’s 1818 Northwest Passage exploration and Sir James Clark
Ross’s 1839 Antarctic voyage—used blacksmith-forged devices to dredge
samples from up to 2000 meters beneath the water’s surface.148 Dredging
pulled up numerous creatures, including shellfish, worms, crustaceans,
corals, and even the rare and beautiful Medusa’s head, or basket starfish.149
Sir James Ross found the seabed to be “teeming with animal life” and con-
cluded that “the extreme pressure at the greatest depth does not appear
to affect these creatures.”150
However, as helpful and insightful as these early expeditions were
to understanding what lay beneath the sea’s surface, these early explorers
focused on surface exploration, not deep-sea ecology or zoological scholar-
ship.151 Specimens from the expeditions deteriorated without proper pres-
ervation techniques, and the explorers often failed to publish their discov-
eries in zoological journals.152 In contrast, the H.M.S. Challenger expedition
from 1872 to 1876 focused entirely on the science and geography of the
deep sea floor.153 The expedition’s purposes included mapping the seabed,
determining the chemistry of the oceans, and finding a global pattern of
deep-water circulation.154 By the time the Challenger returned to England,
the ship had logged approximately 69,000 miles, crossed both the Atlantic
and Pacific Oceans, and reached the edge of Antarctica (see Figure D).155
Ultimately, the Challenger’s discoveries took twenty years to fully ex-
plain, filled fifty volumes of publications, and became the foundation of
modern oceanography.156
146 KOSLOW, supra note 30, at 14.
147 Id. at 14–15.
148 Id. at 16–17.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 17.
151 See id.
152 KOSLOW, supra note 30, at 17.
153 Id. at 23.
154 Id. at 23.
155 Id. at 30.
156 Id. at 32; Deep Seabed Mineral Resources, INT’L SEABED AUTHORITY, https://www.isa
.org.jm/mineral-resources/55 [https://perma.cc/755B-5AQ6] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019);
Tina Bishop et al., Then and Now: The HMS Challenger Expedition and the “Mountains
in the Sea” Expedition, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://oceanexplorer.noaa
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Perhaps the most enduring contribution of the Challenger is its
discovery of minerals and diverse species along the sea floor, including the
marvel that polymetallic nodules litter vast sections of most ocean floors.157
These nodules, along with other mineral deposits, led nations to wonder
if the sea could be mined.158
Figure D: Track of the H.M.S. Challenger, 1872–1876159
B. Historical Development of Laws over the Seas
The law of the sea dates back to ancient empires and philoso-
phies, where the Greeks developed early maritime laws and the Romans
.gov/explorations/03mountains/background/challenger/challenger.html [https://perma.cc
/PF3N-CF5Z] (last updated Dec. 18, 2017).
157 Polymetallic nodules are also called manganese nodules. KOSLOW, supra note 30, at
34; INT’L SEABED AUTH., supra note 39.
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established the “freedom of the seas” doctrine.160 In the second century,
the Roman jurist Marcianus declared the sea, fish, and coastal waters
“communis omnium naturali jure,” or “common or open to all men by the
operation of natural law.”161 Declaring the sea res communis made it “in-
capable of being appropriated, open to the common use of all men.”162
However, with the later (fifteenth and sixteenth centuries) escala-
tion of European exploration, maritime conflicts broke out between com-
peting states, especially over trade routes, fishing rights, taxes, and
policing.163 It was in this period of competition and colonization that the
Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius penned Mare Liberum, a natural law approach
that restated the Roman doctrine of the seas as res communis and rejected
appropriation of the seas.164 He also advocated for the freedom of the seas,
a “laissez-faire philosophy” that would allow explorers, traders, and fisher-
men to use the sea as needed.165 Published in 1609, Grotius’s treatise laid
a foundation for international law.166
However, modern conflicts and technological improvements led to
multiple rules, conferences, and claims over the ocean throughout the
twentieth century.167 In 1911, nations began to extend claims for territo-
rial seas out to six miles, well beyond the historic three-mile “cannon-shot
doctrine,” while World War I lead to assertions for a contiguous zone so
nations could enforce criminal laws at sea.168 Finally, after World War II,
the United States issued two proclamations claiming fishing and regula-
tory authority beyond traditional marine boundaries, as well as exclusive
rights to natural resources on the continental shelf along U.S. coasts.169
Other countries soon followed suit.170
160 Peter Prows, Tough Love: The Dramatic Birth and Looming Demise of UNCLOS Prop-
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C. Modern Mining Interests and the Development of UNCLOS
While polymetallic nodules remained a simple spectacle in the nine-
teenth century, after World War II, nations across the globe began to specu-
late as to whether deep-sea mining could be economical, with “technology
and international price points . . . in place to make deep seabed mining a
commercial reality” as early as the 1970s.171 However, even early on, when
countries first considered mining the seabed, only the United States,
France, Germany, and the Soviet Union had the capital and technology
necessary to attempt nodule mining.172 Concerns over monopolization
and the fear that these minerals would enrich only a handful of nations
lead to the 1967 speech by Malta’s ambassador, Arvid Pardo, to the United
Nations General Assembly.173 Pardo argued that the seabed was the
“common heritage of all mankind,” a source of untold wealth to be ex-
ploited for the benefit of all nations.174
This sentiment struck a chord with many nations, both world
powers and developing states, and led to the 1973 United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea, the third international attempt to establish and
codify international regulations over the sea and seabed175 and which re-
sulted in the comprehensive third United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, or UNCLOS III.176 However, despite the United States’ “substan-
tial influence and involvement in developing UNCLOS,” President Ronald
Reagan declined to sign the final 1982 treaty,177 citing a problematic pro-
vision: Part XI, which governed deep sea mining in international waters.178
More specifically, the administration opposed the 1982 UNCLOS III pro-
visions that declared the deep seabed to be the common heritage of human-
kind, requiring seabed mining technology exchanges and mining royalties,
171 Hartley, supra note 2, at 335.
172 KOSLOW, supra note 30, at 167.
173 U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., 1515th mtg. at 14, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1515 (Nov. 1, 1967).
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175 Hartley, supra note 2, at 335–36; Tong, supra note 7, at 321–22.
176 Tong, supra note 7, at 322.
177 Id.
178 See Raul Pedrozo, Arctic Climate Change and U.S. Accession to the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, 89 INT’L L. STUD. 757, 760–61 (2013); Ronald Reagan,
Statement on United States Participation in the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea (Jan. 29, 1982), https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/12982b
[https://perma.cc/5YTH-ANYM]. See generally United Nation Convention on the Law of
the Sea, Part XI, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397, 445–77 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
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and expressed concerns over the lack of veto powers and creation of an
international mining organization.179
To rectify these disputes, and ensure greater participation in and
compliance with the treaty, nations renegotiated UNCLOS in 1994 to elim-
inate mandatory technology transfers between states, give veto powers
to council member nations, limit international mining regulatory author-
ity under UNCLOS III, and restrict the seabed mining royalties.180 U.S.
President Bill Clinton signed the amended UNCLOS treaty, but the
Senate refused to ratify it.181 Despite long-standing bipartisan support
for UNCLOS III from Presidents, military leaders, and congressional rep-
resentatives, the United States has never ratified UNCLOS.182 Even after
President Barack Obama’s push for ratification in 2012, thirty-four con-
servative senators blocked the required two-thirds majority for the signed
treaty to become law.183
Nevertheless, the United States is an outlier. Today, nations’ ex-
panded jurisdiction over the ocean has been codified in UNCLOS III,184 and
it remains a powerful treaty with 168 party countries.185 Indeed, even the
United States follows many of its rules as customary international law.186
The most important provisions of UNCLOS determine various
boundaries of national jurisdiction out into the ocean: essentially, the
first twelve nautical miles from the coast are the territorial sea, while the
twenty-fourth nautical mile marks the end of the contiguous zone, and
the 200th nautical mile marks the outer limit of the Exclusive Economic
179 See Tong, supra note 7, at 322–24.
180 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, title 6(a), 1836 U.N.T.S. 3; July 28, 1994;
Tong, supra note 7, at 324; Elliot L. Richardson, Treasure Beneath the Sea, N.Y. TIMES
(July 30, 1994), http://www.nytimes.com/1994/07/30/opinion/treasure-beneath-the-sea.html
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-078568 [https://perma.cc/RV5K-5TGN].
184 See UNCLOS, supra note 178, at 44.
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updated Apr. 8, 2019).
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Zone (“EEZ”).187 This 200-nautical-mile zone also gives a country inher-
ent rights over its continental shelf,188 which is governed by other statu-
tory provisions.189
A state may apply to the United Nations Commission on the Limits
of the Continental Shelf to extend its national jurisdiction over its conti-
nental shelf beyond the 200-nautical-mile mark when there is a natural
prolongation of the continental shelf, up to 350 nautical miles out; how-
ever, anything beyond 200 nautical miles remains subject to the sharing
rules for the Area (see below).190 For the purposes of this Article, how-
ever, it is sufficient to know that national jurisdiction does not extend
beyond the EEZ (200 nautical miles from shore) and that nations retain
expansive freedoms on the high seas beyond those boundaries.191
D. Deep-Sea Mining Under UNCLOS III: The Area
1. The International Seabed Authority and Its General Principles
UNCLOS III governs deep-sea mining of the “Area”—“the seabed
and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion.”192 “Resources” is defined as “all solid, liquid or gaseous mineral
resources in situ in the Area at or beneath the seabed, including poly-
metallic nodules.”193 “[R]esources . . . are referred to as ‘minerals’ ” after
recovery from the Area.194
Both the international seabed and its resources are the common
heritage of mankind, and therefore Area activities must be conducted for
187 UNCLOS, supra note 178, at 27, 35, 44.
188 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger./Neth.; Ger./Den.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3,
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it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting
its natural resources. In short, there is here an inherent right.”).
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oil and gas) found there. OCS Lands Act History, BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT.,
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Oct. 28, 2019).
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the benefit of all humanity.195 Pursuant to UNCLOS III, states that mine
the deep seabed must distribute economic shares to developing states,196
encourage and complete marine scientific research,197 promote the trans-
fer of technology and scientific knowledge among States,198 and promote
the participation of developing states in activities within the Area.199 The
International Seabed Authority (“ISA” or “Authority”) ensures implemen-
tation of each of these requirements.200 This regulatory authority is vested
by UNCLOS III and grants the ISA powers to establish rules and proce-
dures for mining, mineral rights, and the subsequent distribution of wealth
to developing states.201
As the driving force behind UNCLOS III’s creation, the common her-
itage principle remains key in seabed administration under UNCLOS III
and Part XI.202 Because UNCLOS III defines the Area as the “common heri-
tage of mankind,” the seabed and its resources cannot “[be] subject to di-
rect claims by sovereign states.”203 In addition, this egalitarian principle
is the basis for monetary redistribution of mining royalties to developing
states, so that all nations may profit from these lucrative res communis
minerals.204
Though some authors interpret this principle to strictly require
communal environmental protection,205 UNCLOS III’s history and pur-
pose make that interpretation unlikely:
195 Id. at 70–71.
196 Id. at 71.
197 UNCLOS, supra note 178, at 72.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 74.
200 Id. at 70–71.
201 See id.
202 See id. at 25; Marie Bourrel et al., The Common Heritage of Mankind as a Means to
Assess and Advance Equity in Deep Sea Mining, MARINE POL’Y 1, 2 (2016); Tong, supra
note 7, at 321–22.
203 Charles W. Schmidt, Going Deep: Cautious Steps Toward Seabed Mining, 123 ENVTL.
HEALTH PERSP. A235, A236 (2015).
204 UNCLOS III does not define developing states, but explains that the Area’s resources
must benefit mankind as a whole,
irrespective of the geographical location of States, whether coastal or
land-locked, and taking into particular consideration the interests and
needs of developing States and of peoples who have not attained full
independence or other self-governing status recognized by the United
Nations in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and
other relevant General Assembly resolutions.
UNCLOS, supra note 178, at 70; see also id. at 71; U.N. GAOR, 22d Sess., supra note 173,
at 14; Fenn, supra note 162, at 727.
205 Hartley, supra note 2, at 350–51.
2019] DIVING TO NEW DEPTHS 243
Desiring by this Convention to develop the principles em-
bodied in resolution 2749 (XXV) of 17 December 1970 in
which the General Assembly of the United Nations solemnly
declared inter alia that the area of the seabed and ocean
floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction, as well as its resources, are the common heri-
tage of mankind, the exploration and exploitation of which
shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole,
irrespective of the geographical location of States, . . . .206
“Shall” implies obligation, not exemption. When reading the UNCLOS III
in full—including the ISA’s multiple use obligations207 and the common
heritage principle208—UNCLOS III instead appears to require sustain-
able exploitation of seabed resources.209
Nevertheless, environmental protection is also required under
UNCLOS III. More specifically, the ISA must “ensure effective protection
for the marine environment from harmful effects.”210 The ISA shall
adopt appropriate rules, regulations and procedures for inter
alia: (a) the prevention, reduction and control of pollution
and other hazards to the marine environment, including the
coastline, and of interference with the ecological balance
of the marine environment, [paying particular attention to
mining activities]; (b) the protection and conservation of the
natural resources of the Area and the prevention of damage
to the flora and fauna of the marine environment.211
In reading these statutory provisions together, UNCLOS III requires bal-
ancing mineral development with marine conservation in a “kind of trust-
eeship obligation on the ISA” to respect the economic and environmental
interests of future generations.212
2. The ISA and the International Mining Code
The ISA has three primary organs pursuant to UNCLOS III: the
Assembly, Council, and Secretariat, as well as the Enterprise, which carries
206 UNCLOS, supra note 178, at 25 (emphasis added).
207 See id. at 71.
208 Id. at 70–71.
209 See id.
210 Id. at 73.
211 Id.
212 Wedding et al., supra note 47, at 144.
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out activities in the Area.213 The Enterprise, however, has yet to under-
take any mining operations.214 The Assembly is the “supreme organ” of the
ISA, with powers to organize the budget, elect the Council and Secretary-
General, and approve proposed rules and regulations.215 As the executive
organ, the Council consists of thirty-six members elected “according to a
complex formula” for diverse representation.216 The Council develops the
ISA’s policies, including all mining regulations, license approvals, emer-
gency orders, and regulations to prevent environmental harm.217 Finally,
the Secretariat is the administrative body charged with “day-to-day ad-
ministration.”218 As of 2019, the ISA has issued comprehensive mining
rules, regulations, and procedures (known collectively as the “Mining
Code”) for each type of mineral deposit in the seabed: polymetallic nod-
ules (adopted July 2000, updated July 2013), polymetallic sulfide deposits
(adopted May 2010), and cobalt crusts (adopted July 2012).219 Each deposit
type requires its own specific set of regulations and procedures because
both the mining methods and environmental concerns in each setting dif-
fer radically from another.220 Nevertheless, the Mining Code universally
applies the precautionary approach221 and prohibits prospecting where
“serious harm to the marine environment” can occur.222 ISA regulations
define “serious harm” as:
any effect from activities in the Area on the marine environ-
ment which represents a significant adverse change in the
213 UNCLOS, supra note 178, at 81.
214 Hartley, supra note 2, at 342.
215 UNCLOS, supra note 178, at 82–83.
216 See id. at 84; Hartley, supra note 2, at 341–42.
217 UNCLOS, supra note 178, at 86; Hartley, supra note 2, at 342.
218 UNCLOS, supra note 178, at 92; Hartley, supra note 2, at 342.
219 The Mining Code, INT’L SEABED AUTH., https://www.isa.org.jm/mining-code [https://
perma.cc/4DDP-BBZM] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
220 Hartley, supra note 2, at 352.
221 Int’l Seabed Auth., Decision of the Council of the International Seabed Authority Relating
to Amendments to the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Nodules
in the Area and Related Matters, at 4, 6, ISBA/19/C/17 (July 22, 2013) [hereinafter Nodules];
Int’l Seabed Auth., Decision of the Assembly of the International Seabed Authority Relating
to the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Cobalt-Rich Ferromanganese Crusts
in the Area, at 3, 5, ISBA/18/A/11 (Oct. 22, 2012) [hereinafter Cobalt Crusts]; Int’l Seabed
Auth., Decision of the Assembly of the International Seabed Authority Relating to the
Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic Sulfides in the Area, at 3,
5, ISBA/16/A/12/Rev.1 (Nov. 15, 2010) [hereinafter Sulfides].
222 Nodules, supra note 221, at 4; Cobalt Crusts, supra note 221, at 3; Sulfides, supra note
221, at 3.
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marine environment determined according to the rules, reg-
ulations and procedures adopted by the Authority on the ba-
sis of internationally recognized standards and practices.223
Because “[t]he potential for serious harm entails serious [environmental]
consequences,” this standard ensures the “best environmental practices
and the precautionary approach.”224
Similar standards were applied by the United Nations Food and
Agricultural Organization (“FAO”) to deep-sea bottom fishing on the high
seas in 2009, requiring consideration of several factors to assess the exis-
tence of “significant adverse impacts” to ecosystem integrity: impact se-
verity, spatial extent, ecosystem sensitivity, impact timing and duration,
ecosystem alterations, probability of future impacts, cumulative effects,
and scientific uncertainty.225 However, the deep sea remains a complex,
remote, and expansive environment; its study is filled with “major knowl-
edge gaps” making the assessment of anthropogenic impacts problematic,
including determining whether those effects are “enduring or transitory.”226
More recently, advocates have encouraged the ISA to adopt the pre-
cautionary approach, a management concept that embraces early-stage
environmental protections, even where “there is potential hazard but sci-
entific uncertainty as to the impact.”227 Consequently, the ISA “pioneered
a precautionary approach” in 2012 by adopting the deep seabed’s first
environmental management plan and designating nine Areas of Particular
Environmental Interest (“APEIs”).228 The APEIs are effectively no-mining
zones within the CCZ and they protect approximately 20 percent of the
CCZ’s seamounts, as well as species and habitats within several zones of
the CCZ’s abyssal plains.229
The ISA specifically designed the APEIs to conserve healthy
marine environments, minimize socioeconomic impacts by exploratory
license holders, protect species and habitats, create buffer zones, account
223 Nodules, supra note 221, at 4; Cobalt Crusts, supra note 221, at 3; Sulfides, supra note
221, at 3.
224 Levin et al., supra note 2, at 246.
225 Id. at 248.
226 Id.
227 Hartley, supra note 2, at 344; Wedding et al., supra note 47, at 144.
228 Wedding et al., supra note 47, at 145; Biodiversity, INT’L SEABED AUTH., https://www
.isa.org.jm/biodiversity-0 [https://perma.cc/YE86-GS97] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
229 Miles Macmillan-Lawler & Peter Townsend Harris, Multivariate Classification of Sea-
mount Morphology: Assessing Seamount Morphotypes in Relation to Marine Jurisdictions
and Bioregions, in OCEAN SOLUTIONS, EARTH SOLUTIONS 329, 357 (2d ed., Dawn J. Wright
ed., 2016); Wedding et al., supra note 47, at 145; INT’L SEABED AUTH., supra note 228.
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for regional ecological gradients, and establish straight-line boundaries
for prompt recognition and compliance.230 Nevertheless, these APEI desig-
nations only exist within the CCZ and they remain subject to ISA modifica-
tion and review, meaning they could be expanded, modified, or removed.231
E. The United States and UNCLOS III
The United States remains a “glaring absence” from the treaty it
helped write, largely because of political controversies over Part XI and its
common heritage principle.232 Because Part XI requires economic benefits
from mining to be shared with developing states, the United States re-
jected UNCLOS III under the then-new President Ronald Reagan.233 The
Reagan administration, and multiple legislators since then, have viewed
Part XI as an infringement on national sovereignty and expressed con-
cerns over the economic distributions to developing states.234 Skeptics of
UNCLOS III were especially concerned about funds going to dictators or
terrorism networks, in addition to apprehension over the conflicting ISA
goals to distribute royalties to developing states while protecting the ma-
rine environment.235
Despite long-standing bipartisan political support since the 1994
changes to UNCLOS III, the Senate still has not ratified the treaty, a crit-
ical step for the United States to be bound by the marine legal regime gov-
erning most of the world.236 In addition, while some politicians still object
to the distribution of royalties, the United States has continually upheld
the common heritage principle.237 President Johnson in 1966 and President
230 Wedding et al., supra note 47, at 145.
231 Id.; see also Int’l Seabed Auth., Environmental Management Plan for the Clarion-
Clipperton Zone, at 13, ISBA/17/LTC/7 (July 13, 2011).
232 Tong, supra note 7, at 318–19.
233 Id.
234 Pedrozo, supra note 178, at 762–63; Tong, supra note 7, at 318–19; Steven Groves,
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea Erodes U.S. Sovereignty over U.S. Extended Con-
tinental Shelf, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (June 7, 2011), http://www.heritage.org/report
/un-convention-the-law-the-sea-erodes-us-sovereignty-over-us-extended-continental-shelf
[https://perma.cc/P4BW-WC6M].
235 James D. Brousseau, Frozen in Time: A Fresh Look at the Law of the Sea and Why the
United States Continues to Fight Against It, 42 S.U. L. REV. 143, 161 (2014); Schmidt,
supra note 203, at A236.
236 Tong, supra note 7, at 324–25; Bosco, supra note 182.
237 30 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (1980) (“on December 17, 1970, the United States supported (by
affirmative vote) the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2749 (XXV) declaring
inter alia the principle that the mineral resources of the deep seabed are the common
heritage of mankind”); Bourrel et al., supra note 202, at 2.
2019] DIVING TO NEW DEPTHS 247
Nixon in 1970, for example, “expressly recognised the principle as being at
the core of the common regime of utilisation for the resources of the sea-
bed.”238 Opposition to UNCLOS III should also recognize that Part XI of
UNCLOS was meant to evolve and develop in tandem with expanding tech-
nical expertise and scientific knowledge of the deep sea.239 Thus, Part XI
primarily imposes obligations on the ISA and grants it broad authority
to develop appropriate mining regulations.240
III. SEABED MINING IN THE LATE 20TH AND 21ST CENTURIES
Even during the renegotiation of UNCLOS III, industries never
fully developed any actual deep-sea mining interests because it proved
expensive and politically controversial and because new mineral deposits
were discovered on land.241 Ultimately, while nodule mining was “generally
considered technically feasible, it [was not] economically viable, largely
due to depressed global metal prices since the early 1980s.”242 Only in the
last several years has deep-sea mining gained ground as an economically
viable mining method to meet increasing natural resource demands.243
A. Increasing Interests in Seabed Minerals: Economic and
Technological Changes
1. Global Terrestrial Mineral Reserves: Bleak Trends and
Forecasts
Forecasts predict declines in the long-term supplies of minerals from
terrestrial reserves over the next century, while mineral demand should
steadily rise and outpace supplies.244 Copper production, for example, will
238 Bourrel et al., supra note 202, at 2.
239 See UNCLOS, supra note 178, at 71–73 (ISA shall provide equitable sharing of eco-
nomic benefits derived from Area activities, ISA shall adopt rules to promote marine
scientific research, ISA shall adopt rules to protect marine environment, ISA shall adopt
rules to protect human life); Tong, supra note 7, at 326–27.
240 See UNCLOS, supra note 178, at 71–73 (ISA shall provide equitable sharing of eco-
nomic benefits derived from Area activities, ISA shall adopt rules to promote marine
scientific research, ISA shall adopt rules to protect marine environment, ISA shall adopt
rules to protect human life); Tong, supra note 7, at 326–27.
241 Hartley, supra note 2, at 336.
242 KOSLOW, supra note 30, at 166–67.
243 Deep-Sea Mining Remains Out of Reach, For Now, STRATFOR (May 13, 2016), https://
worldview.stratfor.com/article/deep-sea-mining-remains-out-reach-now [https://perma.cc
/VD5A-827D].
244 Bolong, supra note 16, at 128, 130–31.
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start to decline as early as 2030, and by 2100 “the 1.7 billion tons demand
will far exceed the 1.6 billion tons of cumulative reserves.”245 Likewise, the
United States faces declines in mining and exploration investment, in-
cluding the huge 35 percent drop in 2015.246 The U.S. Geological Survey
has reported that “[o]ne consequence of the decline in early-stage explo-
ration in the last decade is that the number of viable, large-scale assets
available for potential development has declined.”247
These declining supplies create major problems for economic and
technological development because minerals—especially rare earth ele-
ments—are required for a variety of modern and green energy technologies
critical to the United States and other nations, including photovoltaic
solar cells, solar energy storage, computer chips, cell phones, hybrid and
electric car batteries, high-temperature superalloys and superconductors,
energy-saving lighting, wind turbines, nuclear energy, and hydrogen fuel
cells.248 For example, an electricity-generating solar (photovoltaic) cell uses
minerals like cadmium, gallium, germanium, indium, selenium, and tellu-
rium to construct the semiconductor films that produce positive and neg-
ative charges.249 These minerals are typically “recovered as byproducts”
from other metal productions, but are “critical to varying extents for the
efficient operation of photovoltaic cells.”250 Meanwhile, the front and back
245 Id. at 131.
246 U.S. mining and exploration investment declined 35% in 2015, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=24912 [https://
perma.cc/87S3-AFMM] (“Mining and exploration investment declined 35% in 2015, the
second largest year-over-year decline since the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
began reporting the series in 1948. Most mining and exploration investment reflects pe-
troleum exploration and development, but the category also includes natural gas, coal,
and other minerals. Mining and exploration investment declined from $135 billion in
2014 to $87.7 billion in 2015, weighing down investment growth more than any other
segment of nonresidential investment. Total private fixed investment, of which mining
and exploration is a small subset, grew 4% in 2015 to $2.7 trillion. Low commodity prices
remain a significant factor in U.S. firms’ investment decisions.”).
247 D.R. Wilburn & N.A. Karl, Annual Review 2015: Exploration Review, MINING ENGI-
NEERING MAG. 30, 34 (2016).
248 See Bolong, supra note 16, at 132 n.21; Critical Minerals for the EU Economy: Foresight
to 2030, EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/research
centres/csgr/green/foresight/economy/2013_ec_critical_minerals_for_the_eu_economy_
-_foresight_to_2030.pdf [https://perma.cc/47TY-QA4H] (last visited Oct. 28, 2019).
249 Donald I. Bleiwas, Byproduct Mineral Commodities Used For the Production of Photo-
voltaic Cells, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 2 (2010), https://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1365/Circ1365
.pdf [https://perma.cc/7CFY-R9LQ].
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contacts of the cell are made of conductive metals, like aluminum, copper,
gold, molybdenum, and silver.251
The United States depends heavily on foreign imports for several
commodities, including manganese, cobalt, and platinum.252 For example,
in 2016 “imports made up more than one-half of the U.S. apparent con-
sumption of 50 nonfuel mineral commodities, and the United States was
100% import reliant for 20 of those.”253 These numbers have increased
“from 47 and 19 nonfuel mineral commodities, respectively, in 2015.”254 In
addition, the United States relied on imports for another thirty mineral
commodities, and exported only sixteen nonfuel mineral commodities.255
In fact, in 2016 the United States relied on imports for 100 percent of its
manganese, 100 percent of its rare earth minerals, 91 percent of titanium
(mineral concentrates), 74 percent of its cobalt, 67 percent of its silver,
and 34 percent of its copper consumption.256
Rare earth minerals are particularly important for use in commu-
nications, computing, and weaponry; however, most of the globe’s rare
earth minerals come from China, which forces other nations to consider
the “security of supply.”257 The seabed offers potential deposits to U.S.
mining companies, and reaching into the abyss for those minerals may
increase supplies such as to prevent international monopolies over re-
serves.258 For example, from 2010 to 2015, China imposed strict exporta-
tion limits on rare earth elements, of which China produces 96 percent
of the global supply.259 China’s exportation limits were reportedly “an eco-
nomic weapon” used in retaliation against Japan over the nations’ long-
standing territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.260
251 Id.
252 See Mineral Commodity Summaries 2017, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 6 (2017), https://
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.pdf [https://perma.cc/9RHJ-LXN2].
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puted uninhabited islands offer rich fishing grounds, oil and gas deposits, and a strategic
location near shipping lanes. Bolong, supra note 16, at 134–35; How uninhabited islands
soured China-Japan ties, BBC (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific
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Despite concerns over mineral supplies and monopoly,261 China
remains the leading global producer of twenty-three mineral commodities
of economic value (see Figure E), and it provided approximately 72 per-
cent of the rare earth minerals that the United States imported in 2016.262
Based on current market trends, China should continue to play a leading
role in production and reserves for metals essential for green technology.263
In addition, Chile, Peru, and Bolivia should remain key suppliers of cop-
per and lithium; India remains dominant in iron, steel, and titanium; and
South Africa and Guinea “will be vital in the effort to meet growing de-
mand for platinum, manganese, bauxite, and chromium.”264 Therefore the
United States dramatically lags internationally in production of these in-
creasingly important minerals, making deep-seabed mining more attrac-
tive, both economically and politically.
Figure E: Leading Global Producers of Elements or Elemental Groups265
Reproduced with permission of the British Geological Survey © UKRI
261 Carrington, supra note 29; see also BRITISH GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 257, at 24.
262 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 252, at 134.
263 Press Release, The World Bank, Clean Energy Transition Will Increase Demand for
Minerals, Says New World Bank Report (July 18, 2017), http://www.worldbank.org/en
/news/press-release/2017/07/18/clean-energy-transition-will-increase-demand-for-minerals
-says-new-world-bank-report [https://perma.cc/E9LA-EG7M].
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2. Increasing Green Energy Markets and Consumer Demand
Another factor in the increasing attractiveness of deep-seabed min-
ing is the increasing demand for green energy, such as wind and solar.
As “[c]oncerns regarding the negative impact of climate change [drive] a
major effort to develop and introduce low carbon technologies,” metals
critical to those technologies “will grow rapidly from what is currently a
low base.”266 Much of that demand will stem from the earth’s growing pop-
ulation, which is expected to exceed nine billion by 2050 and provide mil-
lions of new consumers in emerging technology markets.267 Even though
the relevant terrestrial metal deposits are unlikely to be exhausted, grow-
ing demands and limited supplies force mining companies to search out
either lower grade deposits or deposits in extreme environments to meet
mounting demands, even if that means diving the depths of the ocean.268
Renewable energy now accounts for approximately 17 percent of
global energy consumption, and global renewable energy generation should
increase to between 18 and 44 percent by 2050.269 Likewise, global invest-
ments in clean energy grew by more than 4 percent in 2015, totaling
$329 billion.270 In the United States, renewable energy produces about
14 percent of domestic electricity, and states are increasingly turning to
renewable energy technologies: in 2015, for example, Texas installed 3,600
megawatts of new wind capacity, Rocky Mountain states deployed geo-
thermal technology, and California had about 11,987 megawatts of photo-
voltaic solar capacity installed.271 In addition, solar power increased by
about 50 percent worldwide in 2016, with the United States and China
each doubling its solar capacity.272
Nevertheless, while cleaner in terms of carbon emissions, renewable
energy sources—wind, solar, and hydrogen in particular—tend to be more
material intensive, with their respective technologies requiring more metals
266 Bloodworth & Gunn, supra note 28, at 97.
267 See id. at 90.
268 See id. at 93.
269 THE GROWING ROLE OF MINERALS AND METALS FOR A LOW CARBON FUTURE, WORLD BANK
GROUP (2017), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/207371500386458722/pdf/117
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270 4 Charts That Show Renewable Energy is on the Rise in America, OFF. OF ENERGY
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and minerals than fossil-fuel-based energy systems.273 In fact, “[w]ind
turbines require up to fourteen times the iron needed for fossil fuel power
generation, and solar photovoltaics require up to forty times the copper
than traditional coal, oil or natural gas-fired power plants . . . .”274 Like-
wise, “the permanent magnets used to manufacture a 3-megawatt turbine
contain some two tons of rare earth.”275
While some commenters believe that shortages of rare minerals
will encourage industries to produce technology with smarter designs and
more plentiful materials,276 even common metals and minerals are essen-
tial in much greater quantities than was true in the past to meet consumer
demands.277 For instance, solar cells tend to be constructed from one of
four technologies: crystalline silicon cells, copper indium gallium selenide
(“CIGS”) “thin film,” cadmium telluride film, or amorphous silicon, with
each requiring varying combinations of aluminum, copper, indium, iron,
lead, nickel, silver, and zinc.278 Similarly, wind turbines require either sig-
nificant amounts of copper for coil-driven generators or rare earth mag-
nets in direct-drive models.279 Increased use of storage batteries will also
create a growing demand for aluminum, copper, lead, lithium, manganese,
nickel, silver, steel, zinc, and rare earths (including indium, molybdenum,
and neodymium).280
Recycling metals critical to green energy, and other advanced tech-
nologies, assists future availability, “but is unlikely to be sufficient to
satisfy all demand.”281 For example, “[o]ver [90 percent] of the gold, lead,
silver, titanium, and vanadium in recyclable products is currently recycled,
but this only provides [30 to 70 percent] of the necessary supply of these
metals.”282 Meanwhile, there is still very little rare earths recycling around
273 See WORLD BANK GROUP, supra 269, at xii.
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the globe because the expensive processing and purification costs under
current technology exceed the value of recycled rare earths.283 Reusing
minerals also depends on the recyclability of technology and materials.
For example, magnets with plating are trickier to recycle, as magnets are
more subject to corrosion.284 Similarly, the co-mingling of waste batteries
can affect the quantity and quality of producible secondary materials from
recycling, and battery recycling overall tends to focus on recovery of valu-
able metals, like cobalt or nickel.285
In short, because both rare and common minerals are necessary for
modern technological advancements—and are needed in far greater quan-
tities than ever before—mining companies will have to pursue new mineral
deposits to keep pace with the expansion of renewable energy demands.286
This point is illustrated by recent challenges to green energy developments:
in 2009, when the Department of Energy tried to enforce a switch to the
doubly efficient next generation florescent light bulbs, General Electric
and other companies “cried foul,” arguing that they could not produce
enough bulbs because of rare earth mineral scarcity.287 Likewise, the “hopes
of both battery and vehicle manufacturers hang on the mining sector find-
ing more deposits” of precious minerals like cobalt and lithium.288 Many
car and battery companies are rushing to lock in metal supply agreements
as consumer demand for electric vehicles rises and terrestrial supplies
become unreliable.289
International progress towards a low carbon future, based on low
carbon electricity generation and energy-efficient energy-using technolo-
gies, “has huge potential to shift both the scale and composition of the
283 See THOMAS G. GOONAN, RARE EARTH ELEMENTS—END USE AND RECYCLABILITY, U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 2 (2011), https://pubs.usgs.gov/sir/2011/5094/pdf/sir2011-5094.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7LD8-LCJB]; Rare Earth Recycling, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY (Jan. 1, 2017),
https://science.energy.gov/bes/highlights/2017/bes-2017-03-c/ [https://perma.cc/NGE8-TYKM].
284 GOONAN, supra note 283, at 9.
285 Bálint Simon et al., Potential Metal Requirement of Active Materials in Lithium-Ion
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286 See Bloodworth & Gunn, supra note 28, at 93; Vidal et al., supra note 277, at 895.
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288 Karl West, Carmakers’ electric dreams depend on supplies of rare minerals, GUARDIAN
(July 29, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jul/29/electric-cars-battery
-manufacturing-cobalt-mining [https://perma.cc/56SE-SN3S].
289 Id. (indicating that rising consumer demand and the recent political struggles in the
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demand for minerals and metals.”290As such, demand for the following
minerals and metals should increase as renewable technologies become
more important to energy supplies: manganese, iron, titanium, zinc, lead,
aluminum (including bauxite), lithium, silver, steel, cobalt, copper, nickel,
platinum metals, and rare earth minerals including cadmium, molybde-
num, neodymium, and indium.291 However, intra-technology choices will
also drive mineral commodity markets.292 Alternative vehicles, for instance,
create different metal demands: lithium in electric vehicles, lead in hybrid
cars, and platinum in hydrogen-powered vehicles.293
Of course, the economic benefits of deep-sea mining are not re-
stricted to green energy markets alone. The United Kingdom, for exam-
ple, stands to gain £40 billion over a thirty-year period, while Papua New
Guinea’s forty-seven deep-sea mining exploration licenses could generate
as much as half of the nation’s 2014 gross domestic product.294 Ultimately,
therefore, deep-sea mining holds the potential to diversify and strengthen
the economies of both developed and developing nations, as well as turn
poorer nations into the world’s richest countries.295
B. Mining the Area: Current Contracts with the ISA
As of September 2019, the ISA has entered into twenty-nine deep-
seabed exploration contracts across the Area: seventeen contracts for
nodule exploration, seven contracts for polymetallic sulfides, and five for
cobalt crusts.296 For instance, China has multiple contracts within the
Area, including exploratory licenses for polymetallic nodules in the CCZ,
sulfide deposits in the Southwest Indian Ridge, and cobalt crusts in the
Western Pacific Ocean.297 Brazil, India, Russia, Poland, Japan, the United
Kingdom, France, Germany, Belgium, Singapore, the Republic of Korea,
Kiribati, Nauru, Tonga, and the Cook Islands all hold contracts with the
290 WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 269, at xvi.
291 Id. at xii.
292 See The World Bank, supra note 263.
293 Id.
294 Bolong, supra note 16, at 135–36.
295 Rupert Neate, Seabed mining could earn Cook Islands ‘tens of billions of dollars,’
GUARDIAN (Aug. 5, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/aug/05/seabed
-mining-cook-islands-billions [https://perma.cc/6BD3-7FHK].
296 INT’L SEABED AUTH., supra note 46.
297 China Minmetals Corporation Signs Exploration Contract With the International
Seabed Authority, INT’L SEABED AUTH. (June 2017), https://www.isa.org.jm/news/china
-minmetals-corporation-signs-exploration-contract-international-seabed-authority
[https://perma.cc/9CDD-EBYR].
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ISA for various exploratory licenses.298 Some nations have even part-
nered together to obtain contracts, such as the Interoceanmetal Joint
Organization, sponsored jointly by Bulgaria, Cuba, the Czech Republic,
Poland, Russia, and Slovakia.299 With increasing interest in the deep sea-
bed, some coastal nations are even turning to deep-sea mining opportuni-
ties within jurisdictional waters. Saudi Arabia and Sudan, for example,
revived their Atlantis II project for deep-sea mining in the Red Sea (a proj-
ect dating back to 1974) and expect to begin exploration phases by 2020.300
Likewise, Japan recovered ore off the coast of Okinawa in 2017.301
C. Deep-Seabed Mining for the United States
The United States remains absent amongst ISA contracts because
it is not a party to UNCLOS III. Instead of treaty ratification, however,
the United States crafted its own licensing authority over deep-sea
mining in 1980 through the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resource Act
(“DSHMRA”).302 This statute vests licensing authority to the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (“NOAA”).303 While DSHMRA was
“to provide an interim legal framework . . . to facilitate the continued
development of deep seabed mining in an orderly and environmentally
sensitive manner,”304 the act was only meant to govern deep-sea mining
in the Area until UNCLOS III’s ratification.305
Four multinational mining consortia leapt onboard DSHMRA’s li-
censing scheme in 1984, with NOAA issuing ten-year exploration licenses
to Ocean Minerals Company (“OMCO”), Ocean Management, Inc. (“OMI”),
Ocean Mining Associates (“OMA”), and Kennecott Consortium (“KCON”).306
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306 Steven Groves, The U.S. Can Mine the Deep Seabed Without Joining the U.N. Conven-
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Today, Lockheed Martin is the only U.S. entity with active claims in the
CCZ, but it still lacks the insurance and stability of the ISA’s mining
regime.307 Eager to pursue minerals with internationally recognized min-
eral and property rights, Lockheed Martin urged the U.S. Senate to ratify
UNCLOS III in 2012.308 These ratification attempts failed.309 Consequently,
Lockheed Martin’s forty-year interest in polymetallic nodules—generating
“more than 80 patents and invest[ing] more than $500 million in explora-
tion” of the deep seabed, primarily in the CCZ—pushed the company to
utilizing its British subsidiary (UK Seabed Resources) to gain legal access
to the Area.310 Lockheed Martin is a key example of the potential economic
and mineral losses the United States faces as it continues to refuse to
ratify UNCLOS III. Effectively, the political blockade prohibits domestic
companies from pursuing mineral rights in the Area, forcing many U.S.
companies to turn to their foreign subsidiaries “to the detriment of the
United States.”311
IV. LOOKING FORWARD: BALANCING MARINE CONSERVATION AND
SEABED MINING
Despite regulatory, political, and financial roadblocks to deep-sea
mining over the last few decades, nations and corporations have pursued
deep-sea mining opportunities as a means of mineral independence, energy
development, and ample wealth.312 Mineral demands, a developing legal
framework, and attainable mining technology all make deep-sea mining
increasingly likely, even if metal markets slump again.313 Ultimately, the
/report/the-us-can-mine-the-deep-seabed-without-joining-the-un-convention-the-law-the
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313 Compare STRATFOR, supra note 243 (“[T]he viability of deep-sea mining has been in-
creasingly called into question. And as commodity prices dip low once again, the momentum
behind such projects is slowing.”), and JAPAN TIMES, supra note 301 (“The [Japanese]
ministry expects more ore deposits to be found in the area and is planning to commer-
cialize mining at the sites around the middle of 2020 following an economic evaluation
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likely question is not if mining will occur, but when, especially if global
mineral demands outpace terrestrial production.314 The bigger issue is
how to protect deep-sea marine environments at the same time. From the
perspective of the United States, these balancing issues resolve into
three questions: First, is it in the United States’ best interest to ratify
UNCLOS III? Second, how can the ISA regime for the Area better protect
deep-sea marine environments? Finally, what about deep-seabed mining
that occurs within particular nations’ EEZs and continental shelves? This
Part addresses each of these issues in turn.
A. Ratifying UNCLOS III
If the United States wants to improve renewable energy develop-
ments, remain competitive in the global mineral and technology markets,
have a voice on deep-sea mining regulations, or encourage U.S. entities
to mine in the Area, it must ratify UNCLOS III.315 The United States’ rati-
fication of UNCLOS is equally necessary and valuable to this country be-
cause it would further legitimatize the treaty and give the United States
a leadership role over ocean governance, as well as benefit both national
economic interests and international diplomacy.
First and foremost, ratification grants the United States a council
position within the ISA, a voice on the regulatory framework, and a veto
power over administrative decisions like royalty distributions.316 So far,
the United States’ long absence from UNCLOS III has kept the country
from representing its interests as the ISA’s mining framework evolved
and developed.317 In 2012, former U.S. Army General Martin Dempsey
commented on the importance of ratifying UNCLOS:
scheduled for fiscal 2018, which starts next April. Japan relies heavily on mineral imports”
and “could possibly become a resource-producing nation if abundant quantities of deposits
were confirmed”), with Carrington, supra note 29 (“The special metals found in rich
deposits [at the seabed] are critical for smart electronics and crucial green technologies,
such as solar power and electric cars. But as the world’s population rises, demand is now
outstripping the production from mines on land for some important elements.”) and
Patrick, supra note 308 (When UNCLOS came before the U.S. Senate for ratification
again in 2012, “Lockheed Martin sent a strongly worded letter to the Senate saying his
company wanted to join the race for undersea riches, but could not assume investment
risks until it was clear that it would have a clear legal title to its findings.”).
314 See Carrington, supra note 29.
315 See Tong, supra note 7, at 338–41.
316 Khalifa, supra note 307, at 19; Tong, supra note 7, at 338.
317 Tong, supra note 7, at 335.
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The Convention offers an opportunity to exercise global se-
curity leadership. Over 160 nations are party to it, including
every Arctic nation and permanent U.N. Security Council
member. Even so, the world looks to us for leadership. We
have the world’s largest and most capable Navy, the world’s
largest economy and the largest Exclusive Economic Zone
[EEZ]. We will become the leader within the Convention as
soon as we enter it, and that’s never been more important.318
Thus, second, the diplomatic benefits of ratification include recog-
nition of international relations and global interdependence,319 as well as
a firmer foundation against China’s island building in the South China
Sea and unsustainable fishing practices.320 In other words, “[r]atifying
the convention would allow the United States to be a leader, rather than
an observer, on the new frontiers of mining.”321 While staunch political
opposition makes ratification an unlikely result in the coming years,322
ratification remains a fundamental step for the United States to take.
Third, the economic advantages to the United States from ratify-
ing UNCLOS would be monumental, especially because U.S. entities are
reluctant to pursue deep-sea mining claims without the legal insurance
of treaty ratification.323 Lockheed Martin and other major U.S. entities
want the United States to ratify UNCLOS III so that they can pursue Area
exploratory licenses through the ISA, in conformity with international
318 Khalifa, supra note 307, at 17.
319 Tong, supra note 7, at 332 (citing Steven J. Molitor, The Provisional Understanding
Regarding Deep Seabed Matters: An Ill Conceived Regime for U.S. Deep Seabed Mining,
20 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 224, 239 (1987)).
320 Tong, supra note 7, at 336 (“The U.S.’s stance on the South China Sea debate is fully
supported by UNCLOS, although the U.S.’s challenges are empty without its accession.”);
Patrick, supra note 308 (“China, a party to UNCLOS, rejects U.S. interpretations of the
treaty’s freedom of navigation provisions, and continues to assert outlandish claims to
control over virtually the entire South Sea.”); see also Testing the Rule of Law in the South
China Sea, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/opinion/testing
-the-rule-of-law-in-the-south-china-sea.html [https://perma.cc/83DA-LSRT] (explaining
that the Obama administration wanted to handle the international dispute over China’s
island building in the South China Sea through international law and peaceful diplomacy;
however, the United States remains a neutral bystander, and is not party to UNCLOS);
Andrew Jacobs, China’s Appetite Pushes Fisheries to the Brink, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30,
2017), https://nytimes.com/2017/04/30/world/asia/chinas-appetite-pushes-fisheries-to-the
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law.324 Not only does ratification of UNCLOS III grant the United States
access to mineral exploration licensing in the Area, but it also provides
potential access to shared technology and information with UNCLOS III
member states.325 The minerals, in turn, provide needed resources for
technology developments and renewable energy expansions.326
In addition to Area access for hydrothermal sulfide deposits, poly-
metallic nodules, and cobalt crusts, UNCLOS III also provides natural
resource opportunities for oil and gas on the extended continental shelf,
which could be especially important to the United States in the Arctic
Ocean.327 Since 2004, the “U.S. Coast Guard and National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration vessels . . . have logged hundreds of hours
at sea scanning and mapping the seabed to bolster U.S. claims.”328 With
that work now complete, the United States could claim rights to almost
400,000 square miles of extended continental shelf areas under UNCLOS
III,329 including a huge extended shelf off of Alaska.330
In contrast, so long as the United States fails to ratify UNCLOS
III, it may face “an obstacle to full enjoyment of its potential maritime
rights.”331 Without international recognition and legal security, “oil and
gas companies will be reluctant to invest in drilling operations in these
areas.”332 Losing continental shelf resources is a huge economic loss,333
especially in the Arctic, which “could hold up to 12 percent of the world’s
undiscovered oil and 30 percent of its natural gas resources.”334 Further-
more, because claims for extended continental shelves are time consum-
ing and often overlap with other international claims, the United States
is put at a severe disadvantage by remaining outside of UNCLOS III335—
especially considering that the other four Arctic nations have already filed
324 Tong, supra note 7, at 338–40.
325 Id. at 330.
326 See Deep Sea Mining, INT’L UNION FOR CONSERVATION NATURE (July 2018), https://
www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/deep-sea_mining_issues_brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/X44H
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their claims for extended continental shelves in that increasingly accessi-
ble ocean.336 Thus, ratification offers the United States several competi-
tive advantages in mineral development and energy markets.
While the United States might be able to mine deep-sea minerals
without ratifying UNCLOS III—an argument some UNCLOS opponents
suggest is more in line with U.S. interests—such conduct risks diplomatic
grievances and conflicts.337 In addition, the United States’ domestic law
regime for leasing the CCZ could interfere with international mining
claims established through the ISA regime, which are legally recognized
by UNCLOS III’s 168 member states.338 Such behavior would render the
United States a rogue nation in international law and policy. These risks
extend to the commercial realm, where U.S. companies refuse to pursue
deep-sea mining without the legal stability and insurance of UNCLOS.339
B. Establishing Marine Protected Areas
Although each resource extraction method poses risks to various
environments and species, all deep-sea mining techniques can affect deep-
sea habitats across the globe: slope environments are at risk from oil and
gas development, seamounts could be damaged by cobalt crust extraction,
and nodule mining threatens the age-old stability of the vast abyssal
plains.340 One author commented that although deep-sea mineral inter-
ests have “lain dormant for this past half-century . . . if the slumbering
dragon should awake, perhaps driven by the rising resource hunger of
the emerging Asian market, how long will it pause to consider the fate
of . . . deep-sea fauna?”341
Ultimately, although mining techniques and deposit environments
vary radically, seabed mining at each deposit type can cause habitat de-
struction, substrate and geochemistry alterations, sedimentation shifts,
food web disruptions, noise and light pollution, flow regime changes,
sediment plumes, heavy metal contamination, and chemical releases.342
All of these concerns are exacerbated by the fact that “major knowledge
gaps” exist throughout scientific understanding of the deep sea.343 In
336 Id. at 18–19.
337 Groves, supra note 306.
338 Tong, supra note 7, at 331–33; UNITED NATIONS, supra note 185.
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addition, these deep-sea benthic ecosystems provide vital ecological func-
tions on a global scale, including carbon sequestration, nutrient cycling,
and provision of diverse habitats to a range of species.344
Nautilus Minerals insisted that deep-sea mining can balance envi-
ronmental concerns with economic benefits, avoiding terrestrial mining’s
long history of social and environmental mistakes.345 Likewise, some sci-
entists argue that deep-sea mining, while harmful to some degree to deep-
sea ecosystems, is the lesser evil compared to land-based mining because
of its reduced environmental impacts.346 Higher mineral concentrations in
the seabed allow for less extraction overall, while the extracted minerals
provide the raw components of green technology—solar panels, wind tur-
bines, and electric cars, to name a few—that make modern life more sus-
tainable.347 For instance, tellurium “is a key metal for high performance
solar panels and is 50,000 times more concentrated in deep sea deposits
than in land ores.”348
As essential as UNCLOS III ratification is to the United States’
economic and diplomatic well-being with respect to deep-sea mining, it is
equally vital that the United States collaborate internationally to protect
marine ecosystems on and near the Area. While UNCLOS III and ISA
regulations require environmental protections and considerations,349
international efforts should focus on establishing marine protected areas
(“MPAs”) to conserve ecosystems, preserve wildlife, and aid fisheries.350
For example, in October 2016, the international commission over Antarctic
waters (the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources) voted unanimously to designate the Ross Sea as a marine re-
serve.351 The Ross Sea instantly became the world’s largest marine reserve,
and it now protects 598,000 square miles of ocean teeming with plankton,
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346 Id.
347 Id.
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fish, seals, penguins, and whales.352 The designation “shows that the world
can successfully cooperate on global environmental issues.”353
However, preexisting and new mining claims, which can be up to
75,000 square kilometers for nodule exploration, “can erode the effective-
ness of protected-area networks by preempting protection of critical habi-
tats and by limiting population connectivity by causing excessive spacing
between MPAs.”354 Likewise, determining baseline knowledge of the deep
sea and its ecological variability can take years of research.355 For example,
the ten-year Census of Marine Life (2000 to 2010) underscored how little
is known about the ocean, with about 20 percent of the ocean’s volume re-
maining completely unrecorded and unknown.356 Thus, the ISA and inter-
national community should strive to establish MPAs before establishing
additional deep-seabed mining areas. Likewise, marine scientific research
should be conducted on an ongoing basis to evaluate the efficacy of the
protected areas, enhance scientific knowledge about the deep sea, and
adaptively manage the MPAs and APEIs as needed.357 Such actions will
“reduce uncertainty about future mining activities . . . while safeguard-
ing deep-sea biodiversity and ecosystem function at relevant geograph-
ical scales.”358
While countries are already considering the need for more MPAs
in international waters,359 efforts must expand and accelerate. The com-
mon heritage principle supports the protection of deep-sea environments
just as it authorizes mineral activity and royalty distributions.360 If min-
ing can be conducted in ways that minimize environmental impacts, allow
economic growth, and supply the growing demand for renewable energy
technology, deep-sea mining efforts may provide the most practicable sus-
tainable future.
However, as always in mining, the risks remain high and warrant
prudence.361 Ultimately, in a world that depends on oceans for climate,
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356 CENSUS OF MARINE LIFE, supra note 101, at 3.
357 See Wedding et al., supra note 47, at 145.
358 Id.
359 Somini Sengupta, Nations Will Start Talks to Protect Fish of High Seas, N.Y. TIMES
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sustenance, and natural resources, nations must take a balanced approach
to harvesting and utilizing the seas. Many countries already recognize
the importance of establishing marine protected areas, and some interna-
tional efforts to designate marine protections are underway.362
C. Encouraging National Seabed Mining Regulations
To date, most companies have preferred to pursue deep-seabed
mining within the marine boundaries of individual nations, rather than
on the Area.363 However, UNCLOS III protects only the deep seabed be-
yond national jurisdiction, and other aspects of international law protect
only against transboundary environmental harms; impacts within a na-
tion’s EEZ waters and continental shelf remain an issue of national
law.364 Therefore, it is vital that nations collaborate on, and encourage,
mineral nations to enact appropriate seabed mining regulations for their
own continental shelves, extending ISA-like protections closer to shore.
Liability and environmental justice concerns surround the Sol-
wara 1 project, as well as other EEZ based mining projects, and demon-
strate why improved regulation in coastal mineral states is needed. In
most of these operations, foreign corporations can place the burdens of
unknown environmental impacts and ocean stressors on the poorer is-
land nations hosting the mineral activity.365 Various local communities are
concerned with Solwara 1’s significant risks to the environment and ma-
rine resources, with some calling for a halt on all Pacific deep-sea mining
plans.366 At one community forum, Father Vincent Takin of the Diocese
of Kavieng, explained,
In order, for any development to take place, the people must
be the object of development and not subject to it. The people
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have not been fully informed about the impacts of Solwara
1 on the social, cultural, physical and spiritual aspects of
their lives. Therefore they cannot give their consent.367
As such, mineral rich nations (with encouragement from the entire in-
ternational community) should seek to protect their multiple uses and
resources of the sea, including fisheries, navigation, conservation, and
tourism. These uses benefit local uses and traditions and provide revenue
to the state. One starting point may be to model regulations on the ISA
regulations, or look to other coastal nations that have sufficient environ-
mental protections in place. Either way, coastal nations should craft the
new regulations to fit the needs of its unique ocean uses, ecosystems, and
mineral types. Marine spatial planning should also be considered “to ad-
dress specific ocean management challenges and advance [the country’s]
goals for economic development and conservation.”368
CONCLUSION
Mining has been critical to technological development throughout
human history, and past experiences on land demonstrated that it can be
incredibly environmentally destructive.369 Nevertheless, the global econ-
omy has grown dependent on a number of technologies that require rare
and depleting minerals, including the ever-important renewable energy
technologies.370 At the same time, global communities are trying to de-
carbonize our energy supply and combat the effects of climate change.371
Remote and poor quality deposits on land make terrestrial mining expan-
sion increasingly unlikely, especially as pursuit of terrestrial minerals
becomes increasingly uneconomic.372
Meanwhile, the seabed offers high quality deposits in concentrated
areas, giving us a unique potential to develop mining techniques with far
less environmental impact than on land while obtaining the minerals nec-
essary for clean energy production. Therefore, the choices open to nations
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seeking sustainability dwindles down to relinquishing new technologies
or pursuing deep-sea mining in the most environmentally protective way
possible. The difficulty of these choices cannot be understated, but the
conversation over our dependence on minerals needs to start addressing
our current, essential, drive towards renewable energy. Pilot projects just
may show the world if the deep sea can provide a small environmental
footprint, handsome profits, and, hopefully, quality minerals to help us
reach a renewable energy sector.373
373 See Clouse, supra note 7.
